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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is purely a matter of statutory interpretation. As explained below, the Idaho Income 
Tax Act, LC. §1 63-3001 et seq. (the "Idaho Act")2 requires taxpayers to calculate their 2012 Idaho 
taxable income pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as it existed on January 1, 2012 
("IRC").3 That version of the IRC sets the income tax basis of an asset owned by a decedent at its 
date-of-death value pursuant to IRC § 1014. Nonetheless, the Idaho State Tax Commission (the 
"Commission") insists that the "carryover basis" rules previously contained in IRC § 1022 between 
June 1, 2001 and December 17, 2010 ("Repealed § 1022") govern despite having been 
retroactively repealed from the IRC on December 17, 2010.4 The Commission relies primarily on 
the Estate's use of a federal uncodified election (the "Public Law Election") provided at§ 30l(c) 
("TRUIRJCA § 30l(c)") of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 ("TRUIRJCA"), which provided the 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, references to sections("§") refer to sections of the Idaho Code or the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of the United States, as amended, and in effect on the first day of 
January, 2012. However, references to"§ 1022" refer to§ 1022 of the Internal Revenue Code as 
it existed for the years 2001-2009, before it was retroactively repealed on December 17, 2010. 
2 Except where otherwise specified, all references to the "Idaho Act" are to the Idaho Income Tax 
Act, LC. § 63-3001 et. seq. as amended and in effect during the 2012 calendar year, which was the 
year of the Estate's sale of the real property at issue. 
3 Unless otherwise indicated, references to "the Internal Revenue Code of 1986" and "IRC" refer 
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and in effect on the first day of January, 2012. 
4 Section 30l(a) of Public Law 111-312 repealed § 1022 of the Internal Revenue Code on 
December 17, 2010. As indicated in Section 30l(a) of Public Law 111-312, the repeal of§ 1022 
of the Internal Revenue Code applies "as if[§ 1022] had never been enacted." (Emphasis added). 
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Estate relief from the federal estate tax in exchange for calculating its federal income tax with the 
carryover basis rules of Repealed § 1022. As explained below, the Estate denies that Repealed 
§ 1022 and the Public Law Election were incorporated into the Idaho Act on January 1, 2012. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On June 26, 2015, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. (Clerk's Record 
on Appeal (hereinafter referred to as the "R.") at 000042, 000101.) The District Court heard oral 
argument on July 23, 2015. On July 31, 2015, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (the "Memorandum Decision"), granting 
summary judgment to the Commission and entered Judgment on August 21, 2015. (R. at 000229, 
244.) The Estate timely moved for Reconsideration and for Amendment of Judgment on 
September 3, 2015. (R. at 000246.) After initial briefing, the District Court ordered supplemental 
briefs analyzing whether a statutory note to Title 26 of the United States Code ("Title 26") should 
be regarded as part of Title 26 for purposes of the Idaho Act. (R. at 000303.) After reviewing the 
parties' supplemental briefs, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of Judgment ("Reconsidered Decision") 
on November 16, 2015. (R. at 000330.) On December 23, 2015, the Estate timely filed a Notice 
of Appeal of that decision as well as the District Court's Judgment. (R. at 000359.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Zippora Stahl ("Mrs. Stahl") died on June 26, 2010 while domiciled in Jerome County, 
Idaho. (R. at 000006, 000044.) At the time of her death, Mrs. Stahl owned an interest in 
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appreciated real estate located in Chino, California (the "Ranch"). (R. at 000045.) As part of the 
Estate's probate proceeding in California, the fair market value of the Ranch on the date of Mrs. 
Stahl's death was determined to be $16,000,000. Id 
On January 17, 2012, the Estate filed Federal Form 8939 with the Internal Revenue Service 
electing, pursuant to the Public Law Election, to be relieved from paying the federal estate tax that 
would otherwise have been imposed by the federal government on the estates of decedents dying 
in 2010. (R. at 000045, 000300-302.) The State ofldaho has not imposed any form of estate or 
inheritance tax on the estates ofldaho decedents since 2004.5 Therefore, the Estate's filing of the 
Public Law Election produced a federal tax benefit but no Idaho tax benefit. 
The Estate sold the Ranch on December 21, 2012 for $16,318,909. (R. at 000045.) On 
April 15, 2013, the Estate filed an IRS Form 1041 reflecting $14,372,420.00 in federal gain from 
the sale of the Ranch, as required by the Public Law Election, and paid the requisite federal income 
taxes thereon. (R. at 000018-19.) Contemporaneously, the Estate filed Idaho Form 66 for tax year 
2012 mistakenly reporting $14,872,219.00 of Idaho adjusted income and $1,029,107.00 of total 
Idaho tax liability resulting from the sale of the Ranch, which the Estate timely paid. (R. at 
000049.) On September 26, 2013, the Estate filed Amended Form 66 reporting $309,469.00 of 
Idaho adjusted income and $2,672.00 of total Idaho tax liability, and requesting a refund of 
5 Technically, the State ofldaho imposes an estate tax equal in amount to the credit for state death 
taxes allowed by IRC § 2011. However, no credit for state death taxes has been allowed pursuant 
to !RC§ 2011 since December 31, 2004. Therefore, the maximum estate tax levied by the State 
ofldaho is $0.00. See l.C. § 14-403; IRC § 201 l(f) (repealed). 
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$1,026,435.00 of the 2012 Idaho income taxes previously paid. (R. at 000046.) After the 
Commission denied the refund request, the Estate filed its complaint with the District Court in the 
above matter on January 6, 2015. (R. at 000005-9.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether, as discussed in SectionIV.B of this brief, I.C. § 63-301 lB requires the Estate 
to calculate its 2012 "taxable income" in accordance with the IRC including§ 1014 or, as discussed 
in Section IV.C. l of this brief, in accordance with the carryover basis rules of Repealed§ 1022. 
2. Whether, as discussed in Section IV.C.2 of this brief, the version ofl.C. § 63-3004 in 
effect for the 2012 tax year incorporates into its definition of "Internal Revenue Code" the uncodified 
Public Law Election set forth in TRUIRJCA § 30l(c). 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Estate requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 63-
3049( d) and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
"This Court reviews questions oflaw de novo." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823 (1998) 
(citing Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274 (1996)); see also Hummer, 129 Idaho at 279 ("On issues of 
law, this Court exercises free review."). Statutory interpretation, in particular, is "a question oflaw 
this Court reviews de novo." State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011) (citing State v. Anderson, 
145 Idaho 99 (2008)). Here, the District Court noted that the parties "do not dispute the facts" and 
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that "the party whose legal position is correct, in light of the agreed facts, [was] entitled to summary 
judgment." (R. at 000236.) As matters of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law, the 
District Court's Memorandum Decision and Reconsidered Decision are subject to de novo review. 
B. The Estate's Idaho Taxable Income for 2012 Is Calculated Pursuant to the IRC 
Including § 1014. 
As discussed in the following Section IV.B.1 of this brief, the Idaho Act requires the Estate 
to determine its "Idaho taxable income" by first determining its taxable income pursuant to the 
"Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of the United States, as amended, and in effect on the first day of 
January, 2012." As discussed below in Section IV.B.2 of this brief, I.C. § 63-3004's clear and 
unambiguous definition of the IRC unsurprisingly incorporates into the Idaho Act only the 
statutory text of the IRC. Finally, Section IV.B.3 of this brief explains how the Idaho Act requires 
the Estate to calculate its taxable income pursuant to the IRC including IRC § IO 14. 
1. The Idaho Act Requires the Estate to Determine Its "Idaho Taxable Income" 
by First Determining Its Taxable Income under the IRC. 
The Idaho Act imposes a tax on the Estate's "Idaho taxable income." I.C. § 63-3024. 
Through a series of related statutes under the Idaho Act and as previously recognized by this Court 
and the Idaho Attorney General, federal taxable income as determined under the IRC is the starting 
point for determining the Estate's "Idaho taxable income." 
First, I.C. § 63-3011C defines "Idaho taxable income" as "taxable income as modified 
pursuant to the Idaho adjustments specifically provided in [the Idaho Act]." (Emphasis added). 
Next, Idaho Code§ 63-301 IB defines "taxable income" as "federal taxable income as determined 
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under the Internal Revenue Code." (Emphasis added). Finally, LC. § 63-3004, as in effect for 
2012,6 defines "Internal Revenue Code" as "the Internal Revenue Code 0(1986 of the United 
States, as amended, and in effect on the first day of January, 2012." (Emphasis added). This plain 
and unambiguous statutory language clearly requires the Estate to use its federal taxable income 
"as determined under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended, and in effect on the first day 
of January, 2012" as the starting point for calculating its "Idaho taxable income." 
This Court has recognized that very point multiple times. For example, this Court stated 
that "'[t]axable' income is defined as 'federal taxable income as determined under the Internal 
Revenue Code'." Idaho State Tax Comm 'n v. Robert A. and Mary L. Stang, 135 Idaho 800, 802 
(2001 ). Likewise, this Court indicated that "Idaho incorporates the Federal Internal Revenue Code 
by reference." Houston v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 126 Idaho 718, 720 (1995). Furthermore, 
this Court has stated that "[w]e agree ... that the intent of the legislature is to make, 'insofar as 
possible . . . the provisions of the Idaho act identical to the provisions of the Federal Internal 
Revenue Code relating to the measurement of taxable income."' J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 866 (1991) (quoting LC.§ 63-3002). 
Consistent with the Idaho Act's and this Court's clear recognition that federal taxable income 
as determined under the IRC is the starting point for determining a taxpayer's "Idaho taxable 
income," the Idaho Attorney General addressed a 1995 Opinion to the Commission that cogently 
6 The Idaho Legislature amends LC. § 63-3004 every year to incorporate recent amendments to 
the IRC. See House Bill No. 355, vol. 1, c. 2, approved February 6, 2012. 
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explains this concept. In that opinion, the Idaho Attorney General responded to the Connnission's 
inquiry as to whether a provision of the 1995 Self-Employed Health Insurance Act ("SEHIA") Pub. 
L. No. 104-7, 109 Stat. 93, that retroactively provided a deduction for health insurance costs under 
§ 162(/)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code, was incorporated into the Idaho Act by LC. § 63-3004. 
1995 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 11, Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 95-2, 1995 WL 247938. The Attorney 
General noted that President Clinton signed SEHIA into law on April 11, 1995, which is after the 
January I, 1995 effective date (and the enactment date) of Idaho's then-latest amendment to LC.§ 
63-3004 incorporating the Internal Revenue Code "as amended, and in effect on the first day of 
January, 1995." Id. The Attorney General advised that "[t]he Internal Revenue Code 'as amended, 
and in effect on the first day ofJanuary, 1995' did not permit [the] deduction" because the§ 162(/)(6) 
deduction was not part of the Internal Revenue Code on January 1, 1995 and, therefore, was "not a 
deduction available for the computation ofldaho taxes under present Idaho law." Id. Accordingly, 
the Idaho Attorney General instructed the Connnission that the SEHIA provisions allowing the 
deduction were not incorporated into Idaho law by LC. § 63-3004 and, therefore, unavailable to Idaho 
taxpayers calculating their 1994 Idaho taxable incomes. Id 
2. I.C. § 63-3004's Clear and Unambiguous Definition of the IRC Incorporates 
into the Idaho Act Only the Statutory Text of the IRC. 
As noted, the first step in calculating the Estate's "Idaho taxable income" is the 
determination of the Estate's federal taxable income pursuant to the IRC. Therefore, this Court 
must determine precisely which provisions of federal tax law comprise the body of law the Idaho 
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Legislature refers to in LC.§ 63-3004 as "the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of the United States, 
as amended, and in effect on the first day of January, 2012." 
Idaho law governing statutory interpretation is clear. This Court has recently stated that 
because the "best guide to legislative intent is the words of the statute itself, the interpretation of a 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute." Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604 (2015). 
Furthermore, as stated by this Court in Hillcrest Haven Convalescent Ctr. v. Idaho Dept. of Health 
and Welfare, 142 Idaho 123, 125 (2005), "[i]f a statute is clear on its face, it is unnecessary to 
engage the tools of statutory construction." In other words, "[i]f the statute is not ambiguous, this 
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l 
Med. Ct.r., 151 Idaho 889,893 (2011). Finally, this Court also noted that "the interpretation ofa 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Verska, 151 Idaho at 893. 
As explained below, the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the words "Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 of the United States, as amended and in effect of the first day of January, 2012" 
includes only those federal statutes that the U.S. Congress has included in the IRC's statutory text. 
Although that states the obvious, it is important to explain in detail why this is so because, as 
explained in Section IV .C of this brief, the District Court ruled that LC. § 63-3004 incorporates 
into the Idaho Act provisions of federal law that are not part of the IRC. Accordingly, Sections 
IV .B.2.a through IV .B.2.c of this brief discuss the evolution of the IRC from its origin in the 
Revenue Act of 1939 and the Internal Revenue Title of 1954. Section IV.B.2.d of this brief then 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 14 
analyzes the history ofIRC § 770l(a)(29)'s definition of the IRC. Section IV.B.2.e of this brief 
further explains the relationship of the IRC to Title 26 and the concept of "positive law" as their 
sole distinguishing feature. Section IV .B.2.f of this brief then describes Congress' "stated means" 
for amending the IRC. Finally, Section IV.B.2.g concludes this Section IV.B with a discussion of 
why the plain, usual and ordinary meaning of the IRC incorporates only the statutory text ofIRC 
§§ 1- 9834 into the Idaho Act. 
a. The Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Act of 1939. 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which permitted the federal 
government to levy an income tax, became part of the United States Constitution on February 25, 
1913. U.S. Const. amend. XVI. Within months of the amendment's ratification, Congress passed 
the Revenue Act of 1913 which imposed a federal tax on the income of individuals. Boris Bittker 
& Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts ,r 1.1.5. From 1913 until 
1939, federal income tax provisions were scattered through numerous volumes of the U.S. Statutes 
at Large. Id. The Revenue Act of 1939 consolidated and codified those federal income tax 
provisions into the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Id. Except to the extent that specific 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 were amended, it remained intact until 1954. 
b. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was first set forth as an Act of Congress in H. R. 8300 (the 
"1954 Revenue Act") that was signed into law on August 16, 1954. See Internal Revenue Act of 1954, 
Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat., available at https://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/83-591/00002F8A.pdf, 
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a portion of which is attached hereto as Appendix A; see also 1 U.S.C. § 204 (note) (entitled "Title 
26, Internal Revenue Code."). The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 supplanted the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939. See Bittker & Lokken, supra, at 'If 1.1.5. Section (a)(!) of the 1954 Revenue Act 
specifically provides that the "provisions of this Act set forth under the heading 'Internal Revenue 
Title' may be cited as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1954." See The Internal Revenue Act of 1954, 
Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat., available at https://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/83-591/00002F8A.pdf 
( emphasis added). Section ( d) of the 1954 Revenue Act, titled "Enactment of Internal Revenue Title 
Into Law'', provides that "[t]he Internal Revenue Title referred to in subsection (a)(l) is as follows:". Id. 
What follows that colon is a summary of the Internal Revenue Title's subtitles A through G. Id Those 
subtitles are comprised exclusively of Sections 1 through 8023 which are in turn comprised of 
subsections all of which are set forth in the 1954 Revenue Act following the aforementioned colon.7 
Id. Importantly, at page 807 of the 1954 Revenue Act, paragraph 29 of subsection 770 I (a) provides the 
following definition of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954: 
(29) Internal Revenue Code. The term "Internal Revenue Code of 1954" means this 
title, and the term "Internal Revenue Code of 1939" means the Internal Revenue Code 
enacted February 10, 1939, as amended. 
(Emphasis added). Thus, Congress clearly defined the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as being 
comprised exclusively of "this title". The words "this title" appears within the text of the Internal 
Revenue Title of 1954 which, as clearly stated at Section ( d) of the 1954 Revenue Act, is comprised 
7 The prov1s1ons compnsmg the 1954 Revenue Act, Subpart through Subsection, as such 
provisions are subsequently amended are referred to herein as "statutory text." 
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exclusively of the 1954 Revenue Act's statutory text: Subtitles (largest subdivision) to Subsection 
(smallest subdivision).8 Accordingly, the term "Internal Revenue Code of 1954" was clearly defined by 
Congress as consisting of the statutory text (Subtitles through Subsections) of the 1954 Revenue Act. 
c. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
The term "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" first appears in Public Law 99-514, dated 
October 22, 1986 (the "Internal Revenue Act of 1986"). Section 2(a) of the Internal Revenue Act 
of 1986 unambiguously states as follows: 
(a) REDESIGNATION OF 1954 CODE. - The Internal Revenue Title enacted 
August 16. 1954, as heretofore. hereby or hereafter amended, may be cited as the 
'Internal Revenue Code of 1986.' 
(Emphasis added). Therefore, "Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended" is clearly defined as 
consisting of the statutory text of the Internal Revenue Title of 1954 as such text is specifically amended 
by Congress (including the 1986 name change to "Internal Revenue Code of 1986"). In other words, 
Congress created the group of laws it defined as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" and specifically 
defined that group of laws as consisting only of the statutory text originally set forth as the Internal 
Revenue Title of 1954 and amendments to that statutory text enacted by Congress after August 16, 1954. 
d. 1987 Amendment to IRC § 7701(a)(29)'s Definition of the IRC. 
Two years after the Internal Revenue Act of 1986 redesignated the "Internal Revenue Title of 
1954" as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1986," Congress amended IRC § 770l(a)(29) (formerly § 
770l(a)(29) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). Prior to November 10, 1988, IRC § 7701(a)(29) 
8 The Internal Revenue Code continues to be organized in the same manner today as it is organized 
into subtitles, chapters, subchapters, parts, subparts, sections and subsections. 
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remained unchanged from the version first enacted as part of the 1954 Revenue Act. As noted, that 
version of !RC § 7701(a)(29) stated as follows: 
(29) Internal Revenue Code. The term "Internal Revenue Code of 1954" means this 
title, and the term "Internal Revenue Code of 1939" means the Internal Revenue Code 
enacted February 10, 1939, as amended. 
(Emphasis added). As also noted, that version of !RC § 770l(a)(29) was enacted as part of the Internal 
Revenue Title of 1954 and the words "this title" refer to the Internal Revenue Title of 1954. Thereafter, 
Section l(c) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 provided a "clerical amendment" 
that replaced !RC§ 7701(a)(29)'s reference to the year "1954" with the year "1986." Pub. L. No. 100-
647, 102 Stat. 3342. As a result of the Section l(c) amendment, !RC§ 770l(a)(29) states as follows: 
(29) Internal Revenue Code. The term "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" means this 
title, and the term "Internal Revenue Code of 1939" means the Internal Revenue Code 
enacted February 10, 1939, as amended. 
(Emphasis added). No other amendments have ever been made to !RC§ 770l(a)(29)'s text either before 
or after November 10, 1988. Therefore, in the version of the !RC that existed on January I, 2012, !RC 
§ 7701(a)(29)'s reference to the words "this title" continued to be a reference to the Internal Revenue 
Title of 1954 as such title was specifically amended by Congress after August 16, 1954 (including the 
1986 name change to "Internal Revenue Code of 1986").9 
e. Relationship of the IRC to Title 26 and the Concept of "Positive Law". 
9 lnterestingly, the above quoted text of Section 770l(a)(29), along with its reference to the words "this 
title", also appear in Title 26 where the !RC is set forth verbatim as part of Title 26. As discussed in more 
detail below in Section IV.C.2 of this brief, that detail appears to have confused the District Court. 
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All federal statutes, including the federal statutes that comprise the IRC, are published in their 
entirety as Public Laws in the United States Statutes at Large ("Statutes at Large"). 1 U.S.C. § 112. The 
statutory text of the IRC is also set forth verbatim, subtitle through subsection, in Title 26. As well as 
confirming that the IRC and Title 26 contain identical statutes, the statutory note to 1 U.S.C. § 204 also 
establishes the Internal Revenue Code's pedigree as the successor to the statutory text of the Internal 
Revenue Title of 1954 when it states the following: 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted in the form of a separate code by 
act Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. I. Pub. L. 99-514, § 2(a), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 
Stat. 2095, provided that the Internal Revenue Title enacted Aug. 16, 1954, as 
heretofore, hereby, or hereafter amended, may be cited as the "Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986". The sections of Title 26, United States Code, are identical to the 
sections ofthe Internal Revenue Code. 
I U.S.C. § 204 (note) (entitled "Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.") (Emphasis added). 
The subtle distinction between the statutory text of Title 26 and the statutory text of the IRC 
relates only to the concept of"positive law." The provisions of the IRC as they are set forth in the Statutes 
at Large are referred to as "positive law." Mary Whisner, The United States Code, Prima Facie 
Evidence, and Positive Law, 101 Law Libr. J. 545, 556 (2009). The Internal Revenue Code is 
considered to be positive law because the "Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted into positive law 
in the form ofa separate code and, as amended, is the authoritative statement of the law." United States 
v. Mclain, 597 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994, n.6 (D. Minn. 2009) (emphasis added); see also Young v. IRS, 
596 F. Supp 141, 149 (N.D. Ind. 1984)("Congress did enact the Internal Revenue Code as a separate 
Code.") (emphasis added). In contrast, Title 26 was not enacted by Congress in the form of a separate 
code. See Id ( explaining that "although Congress did not pass the Code as a title, it did enact the 
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Internal Revenue Code as a separate code ... which was then denominated as Title 26 by the House 
Judiciary Conunittee pursuant to 1 U.S.C. § 202(a)" after its enactment). Title 26, therefore, is not 
considered to be "positive law." See Whisner, supra, at 556. In describing the IRC's unique 
relationship to Title 26, Professor Whisner explains, "[t]his is a little hard to wrap your head around. 
Title 26 is not positive law, but the Internal Revenue Code ( which is the same as 26 U.S.C) is positive 
law." Id. ( emphasis added). Thus, a reference to the "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" refers to 
the statutory text enacted by Congress as positive law in the form of the separate code comprised 
of the Internal Revenue Title of 1954, as amended (including the 1986 name change to "Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986"). On the other hand, a reference to "Title 26," is a reference to the 
statutory text of the IRC compiled in the format of Title 26 which is not a positive law enactment. 
f. Congress' "Stated Means" for making Amendments to the IRC. 
In keeping with Congress' clear definition of the !RC as positive law enacted in the form of a 
separate code consisting only of (a) the laws originally set forth in the 1954 Revenue Act and 
(b) subsequent Congressional enactments amending those laws, Congress utilizes a clearly defined 
"stated means" for denoting enactments that amend the !RC. For example, Section 1 (b) of 
TRUIRJCA clearly delineates which of its provisions amends the !RC as follows: 
AMENDMENT OF 1986 CODE.--Except as otherwise expressly provided, 
whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms ofan amendment 
to, or repeal of. a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be 
made to a section or other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
(Emphasis added). The intended effect of Congress' "stated means" of amending the !RC is clarified 
in United States v. Tourtellot, 483 B.R. 72, 77-78 (2012), in which the trustee of a bankrupt cigar 
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manufacturer argued that certain assessments imposed upon tobacco manufacturers under the Fair 
and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of2004 ("FETRA") qualified as an additional "tax" excludable 
under IRC § 5702(/)(2)(A) from the sale price used in calculating a federal excise tax on cigars by 
way ofIRC § 5701(a)(2). The Court rejected the argument that the FETRA assessments constituted 
a tax, in part, by looking to the text of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Public Law 108-357, 
under which FETRA was originally enacted. Id. at 84-85. The Court cited to language in Section 
l(b) of Public Law 108-357-identical to Section l(b) ofTRUIRJCA-and observed: 
[W]henever [Public Law 108-357] amends or adds a new section intended to be 
incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code, it names a section or part of the Internal 
Revenue Code and then states that it 'is amended bv inserting after section [ specified 
Code section] the following new section' or 'is amended hv adding at the end the 
following new section,' followed hv the new Internal Revenue Code section number 
and text. 
Id. ( emphasis added) (some alterations in original). The Court further noted that the section of Public 
Law 108-357 enacting FETRA "makes no reference that it is 'amending' or 'repealing' anything" 
and concluded, "Congress's stated means for identifying when provisions of[Public Law 108-357] 
should be construed as amendments to the Internal Revenue Code is simply not employed in the 
FETRA-related provisions at issue here." Id. ( emphasis added). Clearly, therefore, when Congress 
intends to modify the IRC's statutory text it does so explicitly and unambiguously. 
g. Plain, Usual and Ordinary Meaning of the term "Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986". 
As discussed, in J.C. § 63-3004 the Idaho Legislature plainly and unambiguously defined the 
term "Internal Revenue Code" as "the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of the United States, as 
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amended and in effect on the first day of January 2012." In turn, Congress has plainly and 
unambiguously defined the term "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" to include only that positive law 
enactment comprised of the statutory text of the 1954 Revenue Title and subsequent amendments and 
additions made to the statutory text of the 1954 Revenue Title. Those amendments include the 1986 
name change to "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" made by the Internal Revenue Act of 1986 and 
countless other changes specifically made by Congress, prior to January 1, 2012, to that separate 
positive law code. On January 1, 2012, therefore, the IRC consisted of the positive law statutory 
text set forth at IRC §§ 1 - 9834. 10 Accordingly, that statutory text (i.e., IRC §§ 1 - 9834) is what 
LC. § 63-3004 plainly and unambiguously incorporated into the Idaho Act. 
3. The Idaho Act Requires the Estate to Calculate its Taxable Income Pursuant 
to the IRC. 
Calculation of the Estate's federal taxable income as determined under the !RC, comprised 
of§§ 1 - 9834, as required by LC. §§ 63-301 lB and 63-3004 is straightforward. The sections of 
the !RC that are relevant to the calculation of the Estate's Idaho taxable income in 2012 are 
discussed in this Section IV.B.3. !RC§ 63(a) defines "taxable income" as "gross income" minus 
allowable deductions. !RC § 61(a)(3) defines "gross income" to include "[g]ains derived from 
dealings in property." !RC§ 1 OOl(a) defines "gain" on the sale of property as the amount realized 
on the sale (i.e., the sale proceeds) minus "the adjusted basis." IRC § 1011 defines "adjusted basis" 
as the taxpayer's "basis" as defined in applicable provisions ofSubchapter O of Chapter 1 of the 
10 Moreover, the exact statutory text of the IRC was also set forth in Sections 1 - 9834 of Title 
26 but not as positive law. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 9834 (2012). 
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IRC ("Subchapter O"). When the property at issue is acquired from a decedent, IRC § 1014 of 
Subchapter O creates a special rule, defining the property's basis as "the fair market value of the 
property at the date of the decedent's death." In many cases, including this one, IRC § 1014 
provides taxpayers a valuable income tax benefit referred to as a "stepped-up basis". 
As noted, the Idaho Legislature's plain and unambiguous language incorporates the IRC 
as of January 1, 2012 into the Idaho Act. 11 Section 1014 is part of the !RC as of January!, 2012. 
Therefore, the Idaho Act, by requiring the calculation of the Estate's federal taxable income to be 
made pursuant to the terms of the !RC, mandates the Estate's basis in the Ranch to be determined 
by reference to the Ranch's date of death value in accordance with IRC § 1014. 
C. The District Court Erred in Holding that I.C. § 63-3004 Incorporates Federal Tax Law 
That Is Not Part of the IRC into the Idaho Act. 
As discussed in this Section IV.C., the fundamental flaw in the District Court's rulings is the 
District Court's construction of LC. § 63-3004 as incorporating not only the !RC as it existed on 
January !, 2012 but also as incorporating additional federal statutes that were not part of the IRC. 
First, Section IV.C. l of this brief addresses the District Court's error in ruling that Repealed § 1022 
was part of the IRC on January !, 2012. Next, Section IV.C.2 of this brief discusses the District 
Court's error in ruling that the Public Law Election was part of the !RC on January 1, 2012. 
1. The District Court Erred in Holding Repealed§ 1022 Was Part of the IRC 
on January 1, 2012. 
11 See discussion at Section IV .B. l, supra. 
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In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court ruled that the Estate is required to use 
Repealed § 1022 rather than IRC § 1014 to determine its income tax basis in the Ranch. (R. at 
000240.) Ignoring the clear fact that Repealed§ 1022 had been completely repealed from the IRC 
on December 17, 2010, the District Court based its conclusion on sua sponte analysis that had not 
been briefed by either party. (R. at 000239-41.) Due to Repealed§ 1022's total repeal in 2010, it 
was not part of the IRC on January 1, 2012, was not incorporated into the Idaho Act by LC.§ 63-
3004 and could not be used by the Estate to calculate its Idaho taxable income under LC. §§ 63-
301 lB and 63-3011C. Therefore, as discussed in this Section IV.C.l, the District Court's ruling 
in its Memorandum Decision that the repeal of Repealed § 1022 "did not apply to the Estate" was 
clearly in error. 12 The following Sections IV.C.l.a through IV.C.l .d explain why this is so. 
a. Repealed§ 1022's Background. 
On June 7, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA"). Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38. For 
decedents dying after December 31, 2009, EGTRRA repealed the federal estate tax, repealed the 
12 Importantly, the District Court acknowledged this error in the Reconsidered Decision, noting 
that "[ o ]ne of the Estate's arguments [in its Motion for Reconsideration] caused the Court to see 
in a new light the issue the parties had originally asked the Court to decide but the Court had seen 
as unnecessary to decide: whether [the Public Law Election] was incorporated into the Idaho 
Income Tax Act for the 2012 tax year." (R. at 000338.) The District Court then went on to state 
that "the Court concludes it should have decided whether [the Public Law Election] was 
incorporated into the Idaho Income Tax Act for the 2012 tax year, as the parties originally asked." 
Id Nevertheless, the Estate addresses the District Court's analysis here because the District Court 
did not revise its Memorandum Decision to correct its error, but rather stated that "no further 
discussion of the conceptually distinct basis on which the Court initially resolved this case is either 
necessary or productive." Id 
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§ 1014 basis rules, and added§ 1022 to the Internal Revenue Code. EGTRRA was in effect until 
its retroactive repeal on December 17, 20 I 0, when President Barack Obama signed TRUIRJCA. 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296. Section 301(a) of TRUIRJCA ("TRUIRJCA § 30l(a)") 
amended the IRC "to read as [IRC §§ 1014 and 1022] would read if [EGTRRA] had never been 
enacted." (Emphasis added). 13 Therefore, on December 17, 2010, IRC § 1014 was reinstated and 
§ 1022, having been added to the Internal Revenue Code by EGTRRA, was expressly and 
retroactively repealed from the IRC. 
b. Title 26 Indicates that Repealed § 1022 Was Totally Repealed. 
A review of the IRC as published at Title 26 in the United States Code Annotated ("U.S.C.A") 
(West) conclusively confirms that TRUIRJCA § 301(a) repealed§ 1022 from the IRC in its entirety 
effective December 17, 2010. The notation in the U.S.C.A. volume states,"§ 1022. Repealed. Pub. 
L. 111-312, Title III,§ 301(a), Dec. 17, 2010, 124 Stat. 3300 Effective: December 17, 2010." 
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, the text of Title 26 as set forth in the U.S.C.A. does not suggest that 
Repealed§ 1022 was repealed for some taxpayers but not others. Therefore, as of January 1, 2012, 
Repealed§ 1022 did not exist as a section of the IRC with respect to any taxpayer. 
The sections of Title 26 are identical to the sections of the IRC. See I U.S.C. § 204 (note) 
( entitled "Title 26, Internal Revenue Code."). Furthermore, the statutes set forth in Title 26 "establish 
13 The complete text of Section 30 I (a) of TRUIRJCA states, "Each provision of law amended by 
subtitle A or E of title V of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of2001 is 
amended to read as such provision would read if such subtitle had never been enacted." Sections 
1014 and 1022 are part of Subtitle E of title V ofEGTRRA. 
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prima facie the laws of the United States." 1 U.S.C. § 204(a). Importantly, that presumption is 
applicable not only to this Court but to the courts of every state. 1 U.S.C. § 204(a). Thus, the District 
Court erred when it ignored Repealed§ 1022's absence from Title 26 beginning on December 17, 
2010, which establishes prima facie that Repealed§ 1022 was not part of the IRC on January 1, 2012. 
c. Congress' Method of Repeal Indicates its Intention that Repealed§ 1022 
be Completely Repealed from the IRC and that the Basis Rules of 
Repealed§ 1022 be Applied via Off-Code Mechanisms. 
If Congress intended for provisions repealed by TRUIRJCA § 30l(a) to continue to apply as 
provisions of the IRC to estates making the Public law Election, Congress would have enacted a 
section entirely different than TRUIRJCA § 30l(c). As mentioned, Congress' "stated means" for 
incorporating a provision into the IRC is to name a section or part of the IRC "and then state that it 
'is amended bv inserting after section [specified Code section] the following new section' or -~ 
amended bv adding at the end the following new section,' followed bv the new Internal Revenue 
Code section number and text." See United States v. Tourtellot, 483 B.R. 72, 84-85 (Bankr. M.D. 
N.C. 2012) (emphasis added). Accordingly, if Congress had intended to make the basis concepts of 
Repealed § I 022 applicable to taxpayers as a provision of the IRC, it would have retained Repealed 
§ I 022 as part of the IRC and would have amended its statutory text to provide for the application of 
its basis rules only to estates making the Public Law Election. Likewise, Congress would also have 
amended the statutory text ofIRC §§ 1014 and 2001 (imposition of estate tax) to indicate that those 
sections apply to all taxpayers other than those estates making the Public Law Election. Such 
amendments to the texts of those sections would then appear as part of the statutory text of the IRC. 
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Congress did not take that approach. Instead, it utilized "off-code" provisions14 appearing 
nowhere in the text of IRC to (a) apply the basis calculation formula of Repealed § 1022 to the 
assets of estates making the Public Law Election and (b) make IRC §§ 1014 and 2001 inapplicable 
to estates making that election. This is consistent with Congress' approach, as it often enacts off-
code provisions in lieu of statutory amendments for laws that are transitory and/or apply to a limited 
number of taxpayers. See Christopher H. Hanna, The Magic in the Tax Legislative Process, 59 
SMU L. REv. 649, 658-59 (2006). 
Furthermore, the text of the Public Law Election acknowledges TRUIRJCA § 301 (a)'s 
complete repeal of Repealed§ 1022 and explains that "[n]otwithstanding [TRUIRJCA § 30l(a)]," 
estates of decedents dying in 2010 "may elect to avety" the Internal Revenue Code "as though the 
amendments made by [TRUIRJCA § 30l(a)] do not apply." (Emphasis added). Use of the phrase 
"as though" indicates Congress' intent to allow certain taxpayers to indulge in a legal fiction to 
"apply" the basis formula of a completely repealed statute (i.e., Repealed § 1022) as if it had not 
been repealed from the IRC. Likewise, use of the phrase "as though" indicates Congress' intent 
to not include the basis formula of Repealed § 1022 as part of the IRC. Accordingly, TRUIRJCA 
§ 30l(c)'s text confirms that Congress selected to apply the basis rules of Repealed§ 1022 and the 
estate tax repeal provisions of EGTRRA as "off-code" provisions rather than as part of the IRC. 
d. TRUIRJCA § 30I(e) Does Not Support the Conclusion that the Repeal of 
§ 1022 Was Not Total. 
14 Freestanding laws that are part of the general body of federal tax law but are not part of the statutory text of the IRC are known in tax parlance as "non-code" or "off-code" provisions. See Christopher H. Hanna, The Magic in the Tax Legislative Process, 59 SMU L. REV. 649,658 (2006). 
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In support of its conclusion that Repealed § I 022 was not repealed from the Internal Revenue 
Code with respect to the Estate, the District Court erroneously presumed that Congress' repeal of 
Repealed§ 1022 by TRUIRJCA § 30!(a) "was not total" because TRUIRJCA § 301(e)'s use of the 
phrase "except as otherwise provided" supposedly indicates that some of TRUIRJCA § 301's 
amendments do not apply to the IRC for certain taxpayers. (R. at 000239-40.) More specifically, the 
Memorandum Decision surmises that Repealed § 1022 was repealed from the IRC for all taxpayers 
other than estates making the Public Law Election. Id. 
A plain reading ofTRUIRJCA § 301( e), however, in no way suggests that any amendment or 
repeal made to any section o(the Internal Revenue Code by TRUIRJCA § 301 was not total. 
TRUIRJCA § 30l(e) simply states as follows: 
( e) EFFECTIVE DA TE. - Except as provided in this section [30 I], the amendments 
made by this section [301] shall apply to estates of decedents dying, and transfers 
made, after December 31, 2009. 
(Emphasis added). As the title and text ofTRUIRJCA § 301(e) clearly state, TRUIRJCA § 301(e) is 
merely an effective date provision that sets December 31, 2009 as the effective date for each 
amendment or repeal set forth in TRUIRJCA § 301 except where the provisions ofTRUIRJCA § 301 
state a different effective date. For example, the effective date ofTRUIRJCA § 30 I (b)'s amendment 
ofIRC § 2505(a) reads "[o]n and after January I, 2011." In contrast, TRUIRJCA § 301(a) does not 
"otherwise provide" an effective date for its amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. Accordingly, 
all amendments made to the Internal Revenue Code by TRUIRJCA § 30l(a) "apply to estates of 
decedents dying, and transfers made, after December 31, 2009 ." 
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TRUIRJCA § 30l(e)'s function as a simple effective date provision rather than an arcane 
suggestion that "there is an exception somewhere within TRUIRJCA § 301 that renders TRUIRJCA 
§ 301 's amendments ... inapplicable to some estates of decedents whose death occurred after 2009" 
(R. at 000239), is also reinforced by a review ofTRUIRJCA. Almost every section15 ofTRUIRJCA 
that contains amendments to the Internal Revenue Code concludes with an "EFFECTIVE DA TE" 
section. Each of these effective date provisions16 begin with the clause "except as otherwise 
provided" if the section makes two or more amendments to the Internal Revenue Code with different 
effective dates. If the effective dates of the amendments to the Internal Revenue Code made by a 
section of TRUIRJCA are all the same, the effective date provision simply states the effective date 
for all amendments made by that section of the Public Law.17 Clearly, the "except as otherwise 
provided" language ofTRUIRJCA § 30I(e) does not suggest that Repealed§ 1022's repeal from the 
IRC was anything short of total for decedents dying after December 31, 2009. Therefore, the District 
Court erred in holding that Repealed § 1022 was not completely repealed from the IRC and was 
incorporated into the Idaho Act for purposes of determining the Estate's 2012 taxable income. 
2. The Public Law Election Is Not Part of the IRC. 
In addition to erroneously concluding that Repealed§ 1022 was part of the IRC on January 
I, 2012, the District Court also erred in holding that the Public Law Election was incorporated into 
15 Rare exceptions to this general rule include TRUIRJCA § lOl(c), which amends IRC § 23 by adding a Sunset Provision that, by its own terms, expressly states the date it will be effective. 16 See TRUIRJCA §§ 30l(e), 302(f), 754(e). 
17 See, e.g., TRUIRJCA §§ 402, 701, 702, 760, etc. 
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the Idaho Act by LC. § 63-3004's unambiguous definition of the term "Internal Revenue Code." In 
reaching that conclusion, the District Court makes at least three clear errors. First, as discussed in the 
next Section IV .C.2.a of this brief, the Reconsidered Decision ignores the plain and unambiguous 
meaning ofl.C. § 63-3004's definition of the IRC. Second, as discussed in the following Section 
IV.C.2.b of this brief, the Reconsidered Decision misconstrues the interplay among LC. § 63-3004, 
IDAPA 35.0!.01.010.08 and Internal Revenue Code § 7701(a)(29)'s definition of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Finally, as discussed in Section IV.C.2.c of this brief, the Reconsidered Decision 
ignores applicable rules of statutory interpretation. 
a. The District Court Ignores the Plain Meaning of I.C. § 63-3004's 
Definition of the Internal Revenue Code. 
As discussed above, this Court has stated that "[i]f the statute is not ambiguous, this Court 
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011 ). As also noted above, this Court has stated that "the interpretation 
of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Id. at 893. 
Idaho§ 63-3004's definition of the Internal Revenue Code is unambiguous. The phrase 
"Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of the United States, as amended, and in effect on the first day of 
January, 2012" as set forth in the 2012 version ofl.C. § 63-3004 refers only to the statutory text 
originally set forth as the Internal Revenue Title of 1954 as such text had been amended by 
Congress as of January 1, 2012 (including the 1986 name change to "Internal Revenue Code of 
1986"). That statutory text is set forth both in the Statutes At Large (as positive law) and in Title 
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26 (but not as positive law). Therefore, in applying LC. § 63-3004's unambiguous definition of 
the Internal Revenue Code, it must be determined whether or not Congress included the Public 
Law Election within the IRC's statutory text as that text existed on January 1, 2012. 
Importantly, the Record shows there is no disagreement regarding the conclusion that the 
Public Law Election is not part of the IRC's statutory text. For example, the Commission conceded 
multiple times that "the verbiage of the election in question was not incorporated within the four comers 
of the Internal Revenue Code." (R. at 000098.)18 Likewise, the Reconsidered Decision states that the 
"TRUIRJCA § 301(c) [Public Law Election] isn't part of the individual statute enacted by Congress and 
called the 'Internal Revenue Code of 1986"'. (R. at 000343, n. 2.) In connection with that 
acknowledgement, the District Court cited a statement of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Ralph V. Seep, previously stricken from the record, that "TRUIRJCA 
§ 30l(c) [i.e., Public Law Election] isn't part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." Id 
The Estate's, Commission's, District Court's and Mr. Seep's conclusions are based on clear 
and unambiguous statutory authority. As explained above, Congress utilizes a clearly defined 
"stated means" for denoting laws that are to be included within the IRC. 19 For example,§ 30l(b) of 
18 See also (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings (hereinafter referred to as the "Transcript"), p. 
10.) ("[H]e is just saying, 'Yeah, it is not technically Internal Revenue Code,' and we've already 
admitted that .... "); (Transcript, p. 14.) ("What he is saying is it's not technically Internal Revenue 
Code. We didn't literally put it in there, and that's something that the Tax Commission admits. It 
is not literally printed in the four comers of the Internal Revenue Code."); (Transcript, p. 52.) 
("From the feds point of view, they don't view this as an amendment. We agree. We've never 
disputed that. That's not the argument. It's not within the four comers, it's not formally 
technically codified in the language of the Internal Revenue Code.") 
19 See discussion, supra, at Section IV.B.2.f. 
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TRUIRJCA clearly reflects Congress's intent to modify the IRC when it states that "Section 2055(a) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of1986 is amended to read as such paragraph would read if section 
52l(b)(2) of[EGTRRA] had never been enacted." Pub. L. No. 111-312 § 30l(b), 124 Stat. 3296. 
(Emphasis Added).20 In contrast, TRUIRJCA § 301 ( c )' s text indicates that Congress had no intention 
of including the Public Law Election within the statutory text of the IRC. The complete text of 
TRUIRJCA § 301(c) reads as follows: 
SPECIAL ELECTION WITH RESPECT TO ESTATES OF DECEDENTS DYING 
IN 2010.--Notwithstanding subsection (a), in the case of an estate of a decedent dying 
after December 31, 2009, and before January 1, 2011, the executor (within the 
meaning of section 2203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) may elect to apply 
such Code as though the amendments made by subsection (a) do not apply with 
respect to chapter 11 of such Code and with respect to property acquired or passing 
from such decedent (within the meaning of section 1014(b) of such Code). Such 
election shall be made at such time and in such manner as the Secretary of the Treasury 
or the Secretary's delegate shall provide. Such an election once made shall be 
revocable only with the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary's 
delegate. For purposes of section 2652(a)(l) of such Code, the determination of 
whether any property is subject to the tax imposed by such chapter 11 shall be made 
without regard to any election made under this subsection. 
Unlike TRUIRJCA § 30l(b), TRUIRJCA § 30l(c)'s text does not amend any provision of 
the IRC. Rather, the Public Law Election simply offers estates of decedents dying in 2010 with a 
20 
Other examples of Congress' "stated means" of amending the Internal Revenue Code abound 
throughout the Statutes at Large. See, e.g., The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-357 § lOl(b), 118 Stat. 1418 ("The second sentence of [Internal Revenue Code] section 
56(g)(4)(B)(i) is amended by striking "114 or".) (emphasis added); EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-
16 § 101(c)(3), 115 Stat. 38 ("Section 15 [of the Internal Revenue Code] is amended by adding at 
the end the following new subsection:") (emphasis added); TRUIRJCA, Pub. L. No. 111-312 § 
103(a)(l ), 124 Stat. 3296 ("Section 25A(i) [ of the Internal Revenue Code] is amended by striking 
"or 2010" and inserting", 2010, 2011, or 2012".) (emphasis added). 
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federal-level tax election where an estate may calculate federal income by electing to apply a 
hypothetical version of the IRC that would have existed on January I, 2010 in the absence of 
TRUIRJCA's enactment ("may elect to apply [the IRC] as though the amendments made by 
subsection ( a) do not apply with respect to chapter 11 of such Code [ dealing with estate tax] and with 
respect to property acquired or passing from such decedent"). That hypothetical version of the 
Internal Revenue Code was not incorporated into the Idaho Act on January I, 2012. Furthermore, 
and most critically, the clear language of Section 30 I ( c) indicates that Congress did not include the 
Public Law Election as part of the statutory text of the IRC. Therefore, the Public Law Election is 
not included within the statutory text of any version of the IRC including the version that existed on 
January I, 2012 that was incorporated into the Idaho Act by LC.§ 63-3004. 
A review of the statutory text of the IRC relevant to the calculation of federal income tax 
associated with the Estate's sale of the Ranch in this case, namely IRC §§ 1014, 1022 and 2001, as 
published in the United States Code Annotated ("U.S.C.A.") (West) confirms that the Public Law 
Election has never been part of the statutory text of the IRC. (See R. at 000210-18.) The U.S.C.A. 
compilation of the IRC sets forth a "Credit(s)" (i.e., "Text Amendments") section following the 
statutory text of each section of the IRC as set forth in Title 26. (See Id) The Credit(s) section for 
§ 1014 (Basis of Property Acquired by a Decedent) indicates the section was amended by§ 30I(a) of 
TRUIRJCA. (R. at 000212.) The Credit(s) section of Repealed§ 1022 indicates the section was 
repealed by§ 30I(a) ofTRUIRJCA on December 17, 2010. (R. at 000214.) The Credit(s) Section 
for§ 2001 (imposition of the Federal Estate Tax) indicates the section was amended by§§ 302(a)(2) 
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and 302(d)(l) ofTRUIRJCA when making an amendment to the IRC. (R. at 000218.) However, 
TRUIRJCA § 30l(c) is not identified in the Credit(s) section of any IRC section as making an 
amendment to any statutory text of the IRC. 
As discussed above, the 2012 version ofl.C. § 63-3004 plainly and unambiguously defines 
the term "Internal Revenue Code" to mean "the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of the United 
States, as amended and in effect on the first day of January, 2012." When given its plain and 
unambiguous meaning, that language only incorporates into the Idaho Act the statutory text of the 
IRC which is comprised solely of the statutory text of the 1954 Revenue Title and subsequent 
congressional enactments that specifically amend or add to that statutory text (including the 1986 
name change to "Internal Revenue Code of 1986"). Therefore, given the conclusion that the Public 
Law election was not part of the IRC's statutory text on January 1, 2012, which the Commission 
does not dispute, it is simply not possible to conclude that the Public Law Election is incorporated 
into the Idaho Act through I.C. § 63-3004 without ignoring the unambiguous, plain and ordinary 
meaning of LC. § 63-3004. For this reason, the District Court's Reconsidered Decision is in error. 
b. The District Court Misconstrued the Interplay between J.C. § 63-3004, 
IDAP A 35.01.01.010.08 and IRC § 770l(a)(29)'s Defmition of the IRC. 
Even though LC. § 63-3004 unambiguously incorporates only the IRC's statutory text into 
the Idaho Act, the Reconsidered Decision misconstrues LC. § 63-3004 as also incorporating into 
the Idaho Act statutory notes appended to Title 26 by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of 
the U.S. House of Representatives (the "OLRC") that are not part of the IRC. (R. at 000348.) 
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In its analysis of this issue, the District Court first noted that the Idaho Act defines "taxable 
income" as "federal taxable income as determined under the Internal Revenue Code." (R. at 
000334.) Next, it acknowledged that the "Internal Revenue Code," for purposes of the 2012 tax 
year is defined by the 2012 version of LC. § 63-3004 as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of 
the United States, as amended and in effect for the first day of January, 2012." Id Further, the 
District Court noted that if the term "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" is considered to be a term 
not defined in the Idaho Act, then IDAPA 35.01.01.010.08 (the "IDAPA definition") adopts the 
definition of the term as set forth in the Internal Revenue Code. Id Finally, the District Court 
then recognized that IRC § 7701(a)(29) defines "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" as follows: 
(29) Internal Revenue Code. The term "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" means this title, 
and the term "Internal Revenue Code of 1939" means the Internal Revenue Code enacted 
February 10, 1939, as amended. 
Id From that foundation, the District Court concluded that the words "this title" as used in IRC 
§ 7701(a)(29) refer not simply to the statutory text of the IRC but, rather, to an expansive version 
of Title 26 which supposedly includes not only the statutory text of the IRC but also the OLRC's 
statutory notes. (R. at 000342.) Therefore, according to the District Court's convoluted logic, LC. 
§ 63-3004's unambiguous definition of the IRC incorporates into the Idaho Act significantly more 
federal tax law than just the separate code of positive law set forth in the statutory text of the IRC 
as it existed on January 1, 2012. 
The District Court's interpretation of the interplay between LC. § 63-3004, the IDAPA 
definition and IRC § 7701(a)(29) is erroneous for several reasons. First, as discussed in the next 
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Section IV.C.2.b.i of this brief, the words "this title" in IRC § 7701(a)(29) refers to the statutory 
text of the IRC and not to federal tax statutes that are not part of that statutory text. Second, as 
discussed in the following Section IV.C.2.b.ii of this brief, the District Court's construction of the 
IDAP A definition renders it in conflict with the plain meaning of I.C. § 63-3004. Third, as 
discussed in the following Section IV.C.2.b.iii of this brief, there is no authority supporting the 
District Court's interpretation ofIRC § 7701(a)(29) as providing a different definition of the IRC 
depending on whether IRC § 7701(a)(29) appears as positive law in the Statutes At Large or 
appears as non-positive law in Title 26. 
i. The Words "this Title" in § 7701(a)(29) Refers Only to the 
Statutory Text of the IRC. 
As noted, the Reconsidered Decision cites to the IDAPA definition which provides that 
"terms not otherwise defined in the Idaho Income Tax Act or these rules shall have the same 
meanings as is [sic] assigned to them bv the Internal Revenue Code including Section 7701 
relating to definition of terms." IDAPA 35.01.01.010.08 (emphasis added). As also noted, the 
District Court then focuses on the words "this title" in IRC § 770l(a)(29). The District Court 
assumes that since IRC § 770l(a)(29) happens also to be published in Title 26 the words "this 
title" in § 770l(a)(29) must refer to Title 26. Based on that assumption, the District Court 
concludes that that IRC § 7701(a)(29) defines the term "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" as being 
comprised of not just the statutory text of the IRC but also statutory notes appended to Title 26 by 
the OLRC. As a result of its misinterpretation of the words "this title" in IRC § 770!(a)(29), the 
District Court grossly misconstrued the meaning ofIRC § 7701(a)(29) and the IDAPA definition. 
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As discussed above at Section IV.B.2.b of this brief, IRC § 7701(a)(29) was originally 
enacted by Congress as part of the Internal Revenue Title of 1954. The purpose of§ 7701(a)(29) 
of the Internal Revenue Title of 1954 was to define the Internal Revenue Title of 1954 as the 
"Internal Revenue Code of 1954." As also explained at Section IV.B.2.d of this brief, the Internal 
Revenue Act of 1986 and the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 replaced IRC 
§ 770l(a)(29)'s reference to year "1954" with a reference to the year "1986". Importantly, no 
changes to the words "this title" as they appear in IRC § 7701(a)(29) have been made since 
§ 770l(a)(29) was enacted by Congress as part of the Internal Revenue Title of 1954. Thus, the 
words "this title," as they appear in IRC § 7701 (a)(29), clearly reference the Internal Revenue Title 
of 1954 as such title has been specifically amended by Congress (including the 1986 name change 
to the IRC). Therefore, the District Court's conclusion that "this title" refers to Title 26 and 
statutory notes appended thereto rather than merely the IRC's statutory text is clearly erroneous. 
Moreover, the District Court made a second inaccurate assumption when interpreting the 
IDAPA definition. In its construction of IRC § 7701(a)(29), the District Court assumes that the 
IDAPA definition requires undefined terms to be defined by § 770l(a) as set forth in Title 26, 
rather than by§ 770l(a) as set forth in the Internal Revenue Code. (R. at 000348.) Ignoring the 
plain language of the IDAPA definition, the District Court erroneously consults the§ 7701(a)(29) 
definition set forth in Title 26 rather than the !RC§ 770l(a)(29) definition set forth in the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 as published in the Statutes At Large. Id. The clear language of the IDAPA 
definition, however, directs undefined terms to "have the same meanings as is [ sic J assigned to 
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them by the Internal Revenue Code including Section 7701" rather than a meaning assigned to 
them by Section 7701 of Title 26. ID APA 35.01.01.010.08 (emphasis added). 21 By directing that 
terms "shall have the same meanings as is [sic] assigned to them by the Internal Revenue Code" 
the IDAP A definition again confirms that the IRC is the proper context for interpreting the words 
"this title" and further confirms that the words "this title" as set forth in IRC § 7701(a)(29) are 
properly interpreted as a reference to the statutory text of the IRC rather than a broad reference to 
Title 26 and the OLRC's statutory notes. 
ii. The District Court's Interpretation of the IDAP A Definition 
Renders It in Conflict with the Plain Meaning ofl.C. § 63-3004. 
As discussed above, the plain and ordinary meaning of LC. § 63-3004' s definition of the 
Internal Revenue Code incorporates into the Idaho Act only the statutory text of the IRC. 
However, as also discussed above, the District Court misconstrues the IDAP A definition as 
incorporating into the Idaho Act not only the statutory text of the IRC but also the OLRC's notes. 
If the District Court's construction of the IDAPA definition were correct, therefore, the IDAPA 
definition of the IRC is invalid because it contradicts the plain and unambiguous meaning of LC. 
21 As noted above at Section IV.B.2.e and below at Section IV.C.2.b.iii, the definition of"Internal Revenue Code of 1986" as set forth in§ 7701(a)(29) should be the same whether or not one is reading the text of that section from the United States Code or from the Statutes At Large. In both instances, the word "title" as used in § 770l(a)(29) is properly construed as a reference to the statutory text of the IRC. As noted below at Section IV.C.2.b.iii, however, the District Court's rather bizarre formulation gives meanings to § 7701(a)(29) that vary depending on whether the section appears in the Statutes At Large or Title 26. 
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§ 63-3004's definition of the Internal Revenue Code which provides that such code is comprised 
of only the statutory text of the IRC as it existed on January 1, 2012. 
Although the Commission has authority to make rules implementing the Idaho Act, 
including the promulgation of the IDAPA definition, the Commission "cannot validly subvert the 
legislation by promulgating contradictory rules." Roeder Holdings, L.L.C. v. Bd of Equalization 
of Ada County, 136 Idaho 809, 814 (2001) (abrogated on other grounds by Ada County Bd Of 
Equalization v. Highlands Inc., 141 Idaho 202 (2005)). Furthermore, this Court has stated that it 
"will not enforce a regulation that is, in effect, a rewriting of the statute." Moses v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm 'n, 118 Idaho 676,680 (1990). Therefore, assuming arguendo that the District Court's 
construction of the IDAP A definition is correct, that definition should not be enforced by this Court 
because it would be in direct conflict with J.C. § 63-3004's clear and unambiguous definition of 
the Internal Revenue Code as "the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of the United States, as 
amended, and in effect on the first day of January, 2012." As discussed above, that definition of 
the Internal Revenue Code does not incorporate into the Idaho Act provisions of federal tax law 
that are not part of the statutory text of the IRC as it existed on January 1, 2012. 
iii. The District Court's Interpretation of§ 7701(a)(29) as Providing 
Definitions of the IRC that Vary Depending on the Volume in 
which It Is Published Is Not Supported by any Authority and Is 
Simply Wrong as a Matter of Statutory Construction. 
As noted, the District Court interprets the words "this title" as they appear in§ 770l(a)(29) 
to be a reference to Title 26 and statutory notes appended to Title 26 by the OLRC. As also noted, 
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the District Court construes the words "this title" in that way because § 7701(a)(29) appears as 
part of Title 26 in published volumes of the United States Code. Under the District Court's 
formulation, the meaning of the words "this title" is derived from and is dependent on the volume 
in which§ 7701(a)(29) appears. Pursuant to the District Court's logic, therefore, the meaning of 
the words "this title" in IRC § 7701(a)(29) mutates from a reference to "the statutory text of the 
IRC", when § 770 I ( a)(29) is set forth in the Statutes At Large, into a reference to "Title 26 and 
the OLRC's notes", when§ 7701(a)(29) is set forth in Title 26. 
The Estate has found no authority to support varying§ 770l(a)(29)'s definition of the IRC 
depending on whether§ 770l(a)(29) appears as positive law in the Statutes At Large or appears as 
non-positive law in Title 26. Further, neither the District Court nor the Commission has identified 
any authority supporting that interpretation. Indeed, such an interpretation is patently absurd as 
relevant federal authority clearly recognizes that the sections of the IRC are identical to the sections 
of Title 26. As noted above, the note titled 'Title 26, Internal Revenue Code" following I U.S.C. 
204 states that "the Sections of Title 26, United States Code, are identical to the sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code." Likewise, as noted by the court in O 'Boyle v. United States, "the Internal 
Revenue Code and Title 26 are identical, even though they are distinct .... " 2007 WL 2113583, *I 
(S.D. Fla 2007). In other words,§ 770!(a)(29) provides the same definition of the IRC regardless 
of whether§ 770l(a)(29) appears in the Statutes At Large or the United States Code. 
Because the sections of the IRC are identical to the sections of Title 26, § 770l(a)(29)'s 
definition does not change depending on whether§ 770 I (a)(29) is set forth in the Statutes At Large 
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or Title 26. It is important to once again recognize that the words "this title" as used in 
§ 770I(a)(29) are properly considered to be a reference only to the statutory text of the Revenue 
Title of 1954 as such title has been specifically amended by Congress (including the 1986 name 
change to the IRC) and that the identical statutory text is set forth in Title 26 exclusive of statutory 
notes. Accordingly,§ 770l(a)(29) sensibly provides the same definition of the IRC regardless of 
§ 770l(a)(29)'s location in either the Statutes At Large or the United States Code.22 In contrast, 
the District Court's rather bizarre interpretation results in § 770l(a)(29) providing two very 
different definitions of the IRC depending on the volume in which§ 770l(a)(29) appears. 
c. The Reconsidered Decision Ignores Applicable Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation. 
If the Idaho Legislature had intended to incorporate off-code provisions, such as the Public 
Law Election, into the Idaho Act, it would have clearly expressed that intent in the statute. Stated 
differently, the Idaho Legislature's absence of expressed intent to incorporate off-code provisions 
as part of the Idaho Act indicates its intention to not incorporate such provisions. That canon of 
statutory construction, known as expressio unius est exc/usio alterius, is discussed below in the 
next Section IV.C.2.c.i of this brief. The immediately following Section IV.C.2.c.ii of this brief 
discusses how legislatures that truly intend to incorporate off-code provisions of federal tax law 
into their tax acts do so explicitly. Finally, Section IV.C.2.c.iii of this brief discusses the rule of 
22 Consistent with this construction, Idaho Courts treat the sections of the Internal Revenue Code 
and Title 26 identically and interchangeably. See examples at (R. at 000322, n. 9.) 
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statutory construction requiring tax statutes to be construed as favorably as possible to the taxpayer 
and strictly against the Commission. 
i. The District Court's Construction ofl.C. § 63-3004 Violates the 
Canon of Statutory Construction Providing that a Reference to 
Specific Provisions Excludes References to Other Provisions Not 
Mentioned. 
The above- referenced canon of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, was applied by this Court when it ruled that a private restrictive land use covenant 
prohibiting more than two families from residing in a single home did not violate LC. §§ 67-6530 
and 67-6531 which require "zoning laws" to define the term "single family dwelling" to include 
any home in which eight or fewer unrelated elderly persons reside. D & M Country Estates 
Homeowners Ass 'n v. Romriell, 138 Idaho 160, 165 (2002). This Court reasoned, "where a statute 
specifies certain things, designation of the specific excludes other things not mentioned .... 
Thus, the reference to 'zoning' specifically excludes the statute's application to private restrictive 
covenants, which were not mentioned." Id (emphasis added); see also Drainage Dist. No. 2 of 
Ada County v. Ada County, 38 Idaho 778 (1924) ("The fact that these other sections [of the Idaho 
Codified Statutes J exempt certain parties from liability for fees, and do not include drainage 
districts in the exempted classes, is valid ground for holding that such districts are not exempted."). 
Furthermore, the Court in Romriell also indicated that "courts must construe a statute under the 
assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the 
time the statute was passed." 13 8 Idaho at 165. It is certainly reasonable to assume that the 
legislature knew federal law provides that the IRC is comprised only of the statutory text of the 
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Internal Revenue Title of 1954, as amended, when it precisely defined the term "Internal Revenue 
Code" in the 2012 version ofl.C. § 63-3004, as "the Internal Revenue Code 0[1986 of the United 
States, as amended, and in effect on the first day of January, 2012." 
The principles of statutory construction set forth in Romriell and Drainage Dist. No. 2 of 
Ada County are concisely summarized in 2B Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 51 :7 (7'h ed.), 
which explains "where a statute refers specifically to another statute by title or section number, 
there is no reason to think its drafters meant to incorporate more than the provision specifically 
referred to." (quoting Matter of Commitment of Edward S., 570 A.2d 917, 925 (N.J. 1990)) 
(emphasis added). Thus, the Idaho Legislature's incorporation into the Idaho Act of those specific 
federal tax statutes known as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" manifests the legislature's clear 
intent not to incorporate those provisions of federal tax laws which are not part of the IRC, such 
as the Public Law Election and Repealed § 1022, especially since under Romriell the Idaho 
Legislature is presumed to know that those off-code provisions were not part of the !RC when it 
incorporated the IRC into the Idaho Act on February 6, 2012. 
ii. If the Idaho Legislature Intended to Incorporate Provisions of 
Federal Tax Law into the Idaho Act Other than Just the IRC, It 
Would Have Done So Explicitly. 
As discussed above, the Idaho Legislature used clear and unambiguous language to 
describe precisely which federal statues it incorporated into the Idaho Act for the purpose of 
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determining a taxpayer's Idaho taxable income. In LC. § 63-3004, the Legislature simply 
incorporated just "the Internal Revenue Code 0(1986 of the United States, as amended, and in 
effect on the first day of January, 2012." The Idaho Legislature has demonstrated that it 
understands that the provisions of federal tax law are comprised of more than just IRC statutory 
text and has also clearly demonstrated that it will refer to such other provisions when it intends to 
incorporate them into Idaho law. For example, in LC.§ 50-2801(3) the term "Code" is defined as 
the "Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and any related treasury regulations." Likewise, 
LC. § 50-8-103(l)(e) refers to "statutes and regulations o(the United States internal revenue 
service in order to more efficiently allocate exemptions or to achiever qualification for deductions, 
elections, and other tax requirements including, ... for the estate tax marital deduction permitted 
by federal law, ... the qualification of any gift thereunder as a qualified conservation easement fil 
permitted by federal law, or the qualification of any gift for the charitable estate tax deduction 
permitted by federal law . ... " (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, state legislatures that desire to incorporate provisions of federal law that are not 
part of the IRC do so by explicitly referencing them. For example, Colorado imposes an income 
tax on taxable income determined pursuant to § 63 of the "internal revenue code," and unlike 
Idaho, specifically expanded the definition of "internal revenue code" to include not only "the 
provisions of the federal 'Internal Revenue Code of 1986', as amended," but also "other provisions 
o(the laws of the United States relating to federal income taxes . ... " Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-
22-103; 39-22-104 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Colorado incorporated both the IRC, which 
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the statutory footnote to§ 39-22-103 defines as "26 U.S.C.A. § I et seq.," as well as the off-code 
provisions of federal tax law. But for Colorado's reference to 'other provisions of the laws of the 
United States relating to federal income taxes,' no off-code provisions would have been 
incorporated into Colorado's income tax regime. Likewise, Minnesota's income tax act broadens 
its definition of"Internal Revenue Code" to encompass "any uncodi(ied provision in federal law 
that relates to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that are incorporated into Minnesota law." 
Minn. Stat. § 290.0 I Subd. 31 ( emphasis added). Utah also augments its references to the Internal 
Revenue Code to include "other provisions of the laws of the United States relating to federal 
income taxes that are in effect for the taxable year." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-103(2)(b) (emphasis 
added). Unlike Colorado, Minnesota, and Utah, the Idaho Legislature did not incorporated federal 
off-code provisions such as the Public Law Election and Repealed § 1022 into the Idaho Act. 
When states fail to expressly incorporate off-code federal tax provisions into their tax 
regimes, such provisions do not become part of their income tax acts. As an example, the 
California Personal Income Tax Law incorporates portions of the IRC by reference. See, e.g., Cal. 
Rev. & Tax. Code § 18031 (incorporating the IRC statutes for determining gain and loss on 
disposition of property, such as § I 041 ). In 1984, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 17024.5 defined the 
Internal Revenue Code as "Title 26 of the United States Code, including all amendments 
thereto ... " Although in 1984 the California Personal Income Tax Law incorporated IRC § 1041 
by reference, the California Franchise Tax Board ruled that California taxpayers were ineligible to 
utilize, for state tax purposes, a federal election that would provide for the retroactive application 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 45 
ofIRC § 1041 that was contained in an off-code provision of Tax Reform Act of 1984. Cal. Fran. 
Tax. Bd. Notice, May 27, 1988, 1988 WL 188417. The California Franchise Tax Board stated, 
"Both Sections 17024.5 and 18031 refer to the Internal Revenue Code and not to uncodified 
provisions of Acts amending or adding to that Code." Id. ( emphasis added). 
In 1988, and presumably in response to the Franchise Tax Board's ruling, the California 
Legislature amended § 17024.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code to incorporate ''uncodified 
provisions that relate to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that are incorporated for purposes 
of [the Personal Income Tax Law]," thus becoming another state to expressly adopt off-code 
provisions. Idaho did not follow the examples of states like California, Colorado, Minnesota, and 
Utah by expressly incorporating off-code provisions into the Idaho Act. Thus, the Idaho 
Legislature has indicated its intention to not incorporate off-code provisions into the Idaho Act. 
iii. The District Court Violates the Canon of Construction 
Providing that Tax Statutes Be Construed in the Taxpayer's 
Favor and Strictly against the Commission. 
Even if one accepts, arguendo, the District Court's construction of LC. § 63-3004's 
unambiguous definition of the "Internal Revenue Code" as incorporating the Public Law Election 
into the Idaho Act, it would only mean that two plausible interpretations exist as to which body offederal 
tax law is incorporated into the Idaho Act by § 63-3004' s definition of "Internal Revenue Code of 1986." 
The first is the Estate's interpretation that LC. § 63-3004 incorporates only the statutory text of the IRC, 
which is consistent with the plain and unambiguous meaning of the words "Internal Revenue Code of 
1986". The second option is the far less plausible interpretation which expands LC. § 63-3004's 
definition of "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" to also include other federal tax statutes that are not 
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part of the statutory text of the IRC. Therefore, Idaho precedent dictates that the Estate's interpretation 
must prevail because tax statutes "must be construed as favorably as possible to the taxpayer and strictly 
against the taxing authority." J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 852 
(1991) (quoting Futura Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 92 Idaho 288,291 (1968)). 
D. The Estate's Interpretation of I.C. § 63-3004 Is Consistent With Sound Tax Policy. 
The Idaho Legislature's decision to not incorporate off-code provisions into the Idaho Act 
is eminently reasonable from a policy perspective. Construing the Idaho Act to incorporate off-
code provisions would result in the unintended enactment of hidden tax breaks and transitory 
provisions that have no relevance or benefit to Idaho taxpayers. For example, § 1608 of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 preserved charitable deductions to Louisiana State University and the 
University of Texas for donors who "receive [in return for their donations] the right to seating or 
the right to purchase seating in an athletic stadium of such institution." Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 
Stat. 2085, 2771. There is no reason to believe that the Idaho Legislature would have intended to 
incorporate into the Idaho Act an off-code tax break benefiting LSU or UT football fans. 
In this case, incorporating the off-code Public Law Election would result in an unwarranted 
windfall for the Commission at the expense ofldaho taxpayers, which was likely not intended by 
the Idaho Legislature. Like many off-code provisions, the Public Law Election was designed to 
provide transitionary relief to estates of decedents dying in 2010 who would have otherwise lost 
the benefit of EGTRRA's repeal of the federal estate tax. The Public Law Election provides a 
federal-level quid pro quo whereby the Estate could choose to currently forego paying federal 
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estate taxes in exchange for paying higher federal income taxes in the future as the result of the 
loss of the federal IRC § 1014 stepped-up basis. No quid pro quo exists at the state level because 
Idaho does not impose estate taxes regardless of whether the Estate receives an IRC § 1014 
stepped-up basis. Therefore, it should be apparent that the Idaho Legislature did not intended to 
impose on the Estate (or any other decedent's estate) a confiscatory state income tax penalty in the 
form of a loss of the valuable income tax benefit provided by an IRC § 1014 stepped-up basis 
simply because the Estate elected to forego the payment of federal (but not state) estate taxes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Idaho Act requires the Estate to calculate its LC. § 
63-301 lB taxable income pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as it existed on January 1, 
2012 which includes § 1014 of such code. Likewise, it is clear that neither Repealed § 1022 nor the 
Public Law Election were part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as it existed on January 1, 2012. 
Therefore, the Estate respectfully asks this Court to reverse the District Court's Memorandum 
Decision granting the Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the Estate's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, to reverse the District Court's Reconsidered decision denying the 
Estate's Motion for Reconsideration, and to remand to the District Court with instructions to enter 
judgment in the Estate's favor for a refund of taxes paid by the Estate in an amount to be determined 
at trial after recalculation of the Estate's Idaho taxable income based on the amount realized on the 
sale of the Ranch reduced by the Estate's income tax basis in the Ranch determined pursuant to 
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IRC § 1014. The Estate further requests an award of costs and attorney fees under LC. § 63-3049(d) 
and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this l"dayofJune,2016. 
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By:__j'_~~~~~~~~---
Nicholas S. Marshall, ISBN 5578 




INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 
•[;>s':!..,RESS H. R. 8300 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
M.utCH 2S (legislative day, M.uca 1), l9Sf. 
Read twice and referred t.o t.he Committee Oil Fiaancie 
AN ACT 
TO REVISE THE INTERNAL REVENUE UWS 
OF 11!E UNITED STATES 
UJQftlD ftJ.TU 
~MSll't PltlMTUIQ Omo& 
WAEtDIO'J'CDI' I UM 
"-L-------------r7:rr.'i't:'"*1'.RN TO 
egislat/ie Dir:est Uijit 
Room 7016 I 
GEffEIW. AOCOU>alNG oma: 
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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Ir.UCB 23., (Jesi,latin, a.,, 11.uca J), ltM 
Bead tw1ee ud fflemd tD the CoDllllktee on i'1lluee 
AN ACT 
To re'rise &.be .internal m-enue lawa ol the United Stal.es, 
Be it ffl&ltd 6,- di, &na.t. GM Hou.H d R~ttuiffl ,J 1M Uraited 
8tck, of Ammctl in Cffflgrdn UHmbld That (a} C1TAT1ox.-
(l) The provisioua or '- Act set lortb under the heading 0 Inte-r-
ual Rneoue Title" au.y be cited as the "Internal Revenue Code of 
1954,". 
(2) The Intenw ReTcntte Code eaact.ed on February 10. 1939, as 
amended, may be cited u the J•Iu,ternal Revenue Code of 1939". 
(b) Ptn,,tJcATlOH.-Thil!I Act aha.II bt J>l:lblisbed u 'f'olume 68A of 
the United Sta~ Statutes at. lAn!'.e, w1Lh 1.11 appeodix and index; 
bu, wiLbout. mar,iul refe:reates. TJie date of rnatt:menL. bill nunlber, 
public law number, and chapter number, shall be printed aa a 
head.no~ 
(c) Caou REnRRNCll.-For u.ving provilions, tft'eetive dat.e pro\.'l-
aio1111 and other related prO't'i•iom.L. tee ehapter 80 (lee. 7801 and 
following) ol t.he Internal RevenUII t..:ode of HIM. 
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INTERNAL REVENllE TITLE 
Subtitle A-lneome Tues 
CHAPTER 1-NOBMAL TAXES AND SlJRTAll!S 
S.beliapter A-Determination or Tar Liabllltr 
Pan I. Tu Oil IDdlTlchrala. 
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(11) Mn.n.ur OB aA.Yil. fOaCKI ill) A.Jlllll) J'ORCa 01' TB• 
ttnTBD l'!'A.TN.-Thl term II military or nav&l lorce& of the Ullil.ed 
St&c.'' llld. &be term "armed foreell of &he United St.ala" each 
includes aD ~ .uwl nllen'I ~nm~ of the umfonud ...,-.. 
icea wbieh an 1111b.leat to the juriadiction. of I.he Secretary of Deleme, 
the Secretary of the Ann,, the Secrel&r;r of di, Na17, or the Seo,. 
ret&ty of t.be Air Force, and each term alao includel the Cout 
Guard. The btelQ.ben of 1Uch !on:m include commialioned ofticer,a 
lad. pel'IIOllDel below the grad• of commiaeioned offlcm in 1uch r ...... 
(18) WmmoL.DIJlfO A.ODT.-The term "wilhlddiDg egan~" 
DletUll!I arr, penon required to deduct and witlihold anr tu. under 
the proviaiona of aeotloo 144.1 1 1«2, 1443, H61, or 1'61. 
(1'7) HtraDUD AND 1nn.~ med in leCtiom 71,215,082, and 
the Jut arntonoe of IICtion 152, if the husband and. wife therein 
refeind to art divarced, wbereTer appropriate to Ult meamqJ of 
111Ch tectiona, tbl!I &enn ·'wife" mall he rad ''former wife" and the 
""" "huobud" ,hall be ....i ''Iona,, hu,beod"; ll>d, H the J>&r 
meota dl!IIC:libed in lldt:li. RCtiona are made by or on bebaJ.f of &be 
wife or tenner wi!o ,o t.he buabmd 01' lormir lluaknd iute&d of 
rice vena, whennrer ~ppropriat.e t.o the .b!aJU111 of mch aection11 
the term '"huaband" alia.ll be read '"wife" IIDd the tam "wife" .;u be read. "huaband. .. 
(18) lnalllU.TtO!ifil, ON.Unli'n:ON',-The term "iD.teml.tJooal 
organizalion" Dl8llllS a public inter:a.11.t.ioul. organization entitJ.ed to 
eDjOJ°. pri,ilepe, u:emptioaa, 1,bd inununitita .. - in.WD&tiooa.l 
mpaizat.ion Ullder t.he Int«ulional Orpnizalioaa Imuumitiea Act. 
(22 U.S. C. 288-2880. 
(11) Do1n:srro BUlLDDfO A.HD LOA.ff USOCUTIOS.-The t.erm 
1'domest.ic build~ and loan UIIOdatioo" bleaDlll a domea~c buildimr 
and loan aaoci&tioo,, a clomeal.ic aafll!O and loen -.oci&tioa, aoa 
a i'ederal •'riup and loan~ •uhltan&it.Jly al &be buain.. 
of which ie confined to m~ loaoa to members. 
(20) ExnoDB.-For the purpose of appJJ'iDc t.be provisions nf 
1111buL!e A with t111~ kt- ooctritiutiOJII to or tinder a stock bonu, 
~~fi~, or um.uity plan, aocl wi&b reapect; to dialri-
but.iOlle tinder eueh a plan, or l,y a t.run fanning ~ of audi a 
plan, t.be term "cm~~ee" ,ball include , fuli.time life Durance 
salesman who ie comidereci an mployee for lite PllrJICM of chapter 
21, or in t.he i:ue of aerviees pe:rlonnecl befOlr'l January 1, 1951, who 
would be cooaidered &D emplofMI i! hie aervit11111 were porformed 
duriug ..... 
(21) LnY.-T~e term ''levy'' includes the power of di1traintand 
aeinre by any mecma. 
(22) ATrOIINn OIINU.AL.-'11ie t.enn "At.toroey General" mean& 
the Attorney General of t.he United Stats. 
(23) T.ilA.IU.S Tu.s.-Tl1111 term "lu::lble ;r.ear" means the eelen-
du year, or I.be fisc.al J'Ollr endi.og during euch calendar ~. 11poo 
the buia of which the iaxablci income ia computed under iwbt.il.le A. 
"Tanble :,ear" me&111, in &he case of a return made fllf' a fra.ctio11al 
parl.of • year nud• t.be pro1'iaiot11 of aubt.ide A« under nculat.ona 
prellClibed b1 t.he Secretary or hil delegate, I.ha period for which 
tucb return .. made. 
£ FIAcu. nu.-The term. 
11fiacal year" meana &n. accouDling 
ol 12 monU. ea.diag on tJie tu, day of any moat.b. othor than 
h«. 
(25) P.w, OR lMCnHD, FAlD oa .1.coaC11D.-1be terma ''paid or 
incurred" and ''paid or aocrued" ahaU be amuil.tued ~ to 
t.he method of &ccc.~ apoo Iba Lui& of which I.he tau.We inoome 
ia NDPUted under eubtii.le A, 
t. ·, •. 
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(26) T&.t.DB 011 •11111NU1.-'l'he Win "trade or baaia•" ht- ..... (,v.La.c. dud1111 the ~ of cha fnnc&I.ODI of a pabJio oftic:e. (27) Ta oomrr,-The term !"J.'u: Court'' lllMDI the Tu Collrt of t.be United States. 
(28) Orm na111.-Any term IJllld in &bit lllbtit.le wilh ~ ...._ to the app&cation or, or in eormect.ion witb, 1be ~ of any other irubtJIJe of thi, t.itle shall have tbe Blllll& meaning u in 8Uch provisions. 
(29) brnaJJAL IIZVP'tf• CODE.-'nle tenn "Internal Ruenue Code of 1964" means t.bie titJe, and the term '"Internal Revenue Clodeof 1939" meam the ID&emal Rffenue Cede enacted Febru&ry 10, 1939, u 1meoded. 
(b) lNci.vtlD AJl'D 11'CLUDlNG.-Tbe &en:m ,,.mcludea" and •<"m-eluding" when used in a deJinit.ion contained In thia tit.le sh&ll not be deemed to exclude other ,hinp Ol.herwiae within the meaning of &he term defined. 
(c) Cxou RnsRERl%8.-
(l) 0reB8 DEnJflTIONS.-
f'..- • .._. ••1._, sa., ,on....,~°' nu 1 e1 u.11.,._ 8cue. C.-: 
(I) lfqwtu u 1ac111•111 ....... ucdo• t. '! .... ., .. 1.e1 ... , ............ J. (_M___ L 
(4 0 .......... 
lg:.~ ·.:.-=.;1n~.::.: .:;..~ 1, ,::J' q ladHlq: .a 111-•'•.«er~ .. NClo ._ (8 Y•Wde u !Mh .... Ill w el Jud ln-:11 ::1 C Ndlla 4. C ~-----•llld .... __..Md ........ - .. 
(2) EFnCT OP l'a08& 11n11RElfcu..-
,..., er.ct.,_.. Nlernca la W. da&o ... ~,_(a), 
31:!oU 
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